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SUBJECT: PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1972

1. (C) This report evaluates the operational effectiveness of the ^{Anti-Terrorist} PHUNG HOANG Program during August and September 1972.

Sources used include Province Reports (RCS: MACCORDS 34.01. R3) for the months of August and September 1972 and selected GVN documents. Informal evaluations based on applicable criteria were prepared by the Senior PHUNG HOANG Advisors of the four Military Regions. The original language of the Province reports and the evaluation was retained to the extent possible to preserve the accuracy of the remarks.

2. (C) The common criteria applicable to each of the 44 provinces were as follows:

a. Degree of integration: The degree of integration of the functions of the former Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (IOCC's) into the new Police Operations Centers (POC's).

b. Degree of GVN emphasis: A statement, when facts warrant it, of interest by GVN political chiefs and police commanders in, and support for, the PHUNG HOANG Program.

c. Ability to carry out specific targeting techniques: An evaluation of demonstrated ability to neutralize selected members of the VCI using approved operational techniques and

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proper coordination between appropriate POPAT elements.

d. Problem areas or comments: Self explanatory.

3. (C) A country-wide evaluation of the PHUNG HOANG Program is as follows:

a. Integration: All IOCC's have been integrated into District and Province POC's, except in a few instances where the integration has been hampered due to a lack of physical space, or occupation by NVA/VC forces. ~~(See TAB A for these exceptions.)~~ In those few locations where available space is a problem, the National Police are fully cognizant of the necessity to accomplish the integration and have requested additional funds or facilities to do so.

b. Degree of GVN emphasis: The ^{Anti-Terrorist} PHUNG HOANG Program in Military Region IV has long had the advantage of command emphasis on the part of the Corps Commander. This attitude has permeated down to District level, and is a major factor in this region's relative success with the ^{anti-Terrorist} PHUNG HOANG program. Similar command emphasis has been slowly developing in the other Military Regions, and is evident now in the statements and actions of respective Corps Commanders. As happened during the April invasion, cease-fire speculation during the period appears to have emphasized the critical necessity of dealing decisively with the VCI. Conversely, there are

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still reported instances of Chiefs of districts and provinces, and their respective National Police Commanders, either failing to understand the ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ Program, or for their own reasons, failing to give it their active support. *all*

c. ~~Specific Targeting:~~ Gross neutralizations, as reflected in preliminary GVN figures, are climbing. (See TAB B.) Harder to isolate, but believed valid, is an apparent increase in the use of specific targeting techniques. The advantages of unity of command and simplicity inherent in the POC concept probably account for this development.

~~However,~~ ^{It} is also apparent that in those provinces where the military situation precludes the National Police from operating freely, specific targeting techniques are relatively ineffective due to a lack of available combat power. In such situations, close coordination and combined military/police operations will be necessary to achieve VCI neutralizations by specifically designating confirmed VCI targets as secondary objectives of conventional local operations. *all*

d. Problem Areas: The problems that are common to ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ operations at province level and below fall into the following general areas:

(1) Command emphasis and command control. The effectiveness of the ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort at all levels

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varies directly with the attitude of the key political leaders and police commanders. The problems that persist in most of the provinces are the result of poor command emphasis and the absence of firm command control.

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(2) Intelligence coordination. The problem of lack of effective coordination of intelligence activities is persistent and serious. There are still many locations where the Police, the Sector or Sub-Sector S2 and the Military Security Service (MSS) go their separate ways, It is hoped that the Permanent Offices, which include representation from almost all the intelligence and security agencies, can become a means of increasing interagency cooperation, but this will require, at the very least, continual command interest and attention on the part of District and Province Chiefs.

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(3) POC operations. Although a great number of the personnel manning the POC's have received specialized training at Regional and National schools, ^{some of the POC} the "petty ~~bureaucrat - file clerk~~" mentality still exists. Some of ~~this is caused~~ ^{personnel are not efficient.} ~~this is perpetuated~~ by the inability of the POC personnel to visualize and plan the types of operations necessary to apprehend VCI living in contested areas. Not knowing what to do with the information they receive they merely file it.

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4. (U) Individual province assessments and comments are contained in Incl 1.

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*Police
Operations
Centers*

UPDATED LIST OF PIOCC & DIOCC WHICH
HAVE NOT BEEN INTEGRATED INTO POC.

MR I

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

Hiep Duc, Cam Lo, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Hai Lang, Huong Hoa,
Mai Linh, and Trieu Phong DIOCC

MR II

BINH DINH PROVINCE

Hoai An, Hoai Nhon, Tam Quan DIOCC

KONTUM PROVINCE

Dakto, Kontum DIOCC

MR III

BINH LONG PROVINCE

Binh Long PIOCC

An Loc, Chon Thanh and Loc Ninh DIOCC

PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

Duc Thanh DIOCC

PHUOC LONG PROVINCE

Bo Duc DIOCC

MR IV


KIEN TUONG PROVINCE

Tuyen Binh DIOCC

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B

PRELIMINARY GVN NEUTRALIZATION
FIGURES BY MONTH



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I MILITARY REGION I

1. QUANG NAM PROVINCE:

All IOCC's are completely integrated into the POC's. Although 98 of 103 Village National Police Chiefs have attended PHUNG HOANG training of some sort, their counterparts at District level have not, nor have the Province Permanent Office Chief and Province POC Chief. Fifty-two A/B level VCI were given "An Tri" detentions in August and 107 A/B in September.

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2. QUANG NGAI PROVINCE:

Since the integration of ^{*Anti-Terrorist*} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ activities into the National Police there has been a slight decrease in activities. Although the Province POC Chief is a well-trained, capable, enthusiastic leader, experienced in ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ ^{*Anti-Terrorist*} activities, his boss, the Province National Police Chief, taking his cue from an apathetic Province Chief, does not share his enthusiasm. The Province Security Council appears to be relatively energetic, having met three times in September to consider a total of 107 cases. Total neutralizations for September, including 4 ralliers, amounted to 32.

all

3. QUANG TIN PROVINCE:

^{*Anti-Terrorist activities*} "PHUNG HOANG in Quang Tin" is a completely Vietnamese show," and one that evidently works quite well. The Province NP Chief and the POC Chief are both well trained and competent, as are their subordinates.

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The POC and the Permanent Office work well together, and can generate quick reactions to intelligence. The POC had a dedicated reaction force which is effectively employed throughout the Province against ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ targets. In August there were five National Police and seven combined National Police/military/para-military operations. In September there were 47 National Police operations, and 31 combined operations. Twenty-four of the September operations were in response to ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ intelligence. In August the Province Chief held a meeting of all members of the Province, District and Village PHUNG HOANG committees for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence gathering efforts of all agencies to target VCI and to launch a campaign to identify and neutralize more A and B category VCI. This command emphasis, backed up by the willingness to commit military force in support of the National Police and to react on ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ - POC generated intelligence, appears to be having results.

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4. QUANG TRI:

The scheduled integration of IOCC's into POC's was not met because of the NVA invasion of the Province. To date the Province PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office and the POC's for Hai Lang, Mai Linh, and Trieu Phong Districts have been organized and are operational

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within the Danang area refugee camps. Plans for the coming month are to organize the POC's for the remaining four districts and to integrate the POC activities into the overall security plan for the refugee camps. Despite the disruption, Quang Tri ^{POC} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ National Police personnel are continuing to attend regional and national level ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ schools, and have been given additional allocations to continue the training pace over the next few months.

5. THUA THIEN (AND HUE MUNICIPALITY):

Police Operations Centers are organized and active throughout the Province. The Province POC, thanks to the leadership and ability of the Province National Police Chief and the POC Chief, is considered the best in the Region, and compares very favorably with any in the country. There have been significant operational successes using both specific targeting by Special Branch and general area targeting, by combined National Police/Territorial forces. Unfortunately, there is a wide gap between Province and District POC's in general ability and initiative. The District POC's still suffer from the "file clerk - petty bureaucrat" mentality, being more concerned with office procedures than neutralizations. The Province POC Chief is aware of this shortcoming and a corrective training course was conducted in September for District personnel.

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II MILITARY REGION II

1. BINH DINH:

The number of operations even nominally called *Anti-Terrorist* "PHUNG HOANG" has declined for two straight months. In August there were 387 *Anti-Terrorist* PHUNG HOANG operations, 88 of which were directed against specific targets, resulting in 97 A/B neutralizations. In September there were 349 operations, 77 of which were against specific targets, resulting in 34 A/B neutralizations. There appears to be little coordination of the intelligence effort, and poor response to intelligence requirements. The Province POC is not exercising control over District POC's. On the plus side, the CHIEU HOI Service and the ^{SKG} ~~PRU~~ are cooperating well with the National Police, and achieving significant neutralizations. *all*

2. BINH THUAN:

District POC's are undermanned, although there appears to be good communications and coordination between the various POC's. The Province Security Council is functioning well, and is handing out sentences which average twice the length of previous sentences. This is thought to be due to national policy directives rather than local initiative. *all*

3. DARLAC:

Anti-Terrorist PHUNG HOANG activities are rated as good in one District, fair to poor in two Districts, and non-existent in the fourth District. A major hindrance appears to be *all*

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POC/anti-Terrorist

the use of ~~PHUNG-HOANG~~ trained personnel for routine police work. The Province Chief appears to be apathetic to *the Anti-Terrorist Programs,* ~~to PHUNG-HOANG~~, an attitude which has transmitted itself to the District Chiefs. Support for intelligence collection is lacking. Ninety information requests have been initiated by the National Police, but no replies have been received. The National Police do not have ready access to captured documents, VC prisoners or Hoi Chanh.

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Province report indicates that the Province Chief ordered *anti-Terrorist* PHUNG HOANG forces including *SRG FP* ~~PHU~~, NPFF and the Sector Intelligence Platoon into operational areas with orders to remain in the field until they had valid results!" *all*

6. LAM DONG:

Province Reports for August and September indicate marked progress in the number of VCI apprehended. Documents captured by territorial forces led to the discovery of 24 suspected VCI in September. Those arrested included members of youth groups and RF units. As some of these individuals had been working for the VC for several years, their continued exploitation gives promise of further neutralizations. However, the MR II Senior PHUNG HOANG Advisor still characterizes the province as having a poor operational performance directly resulting from a lack of intelligence and of aggressive operations into VCI areas. He cites the basic problem to be the attitude of the Province Chief. *all*

7. NINH THUAN:

Lack of specific intelligence on which to base operations has been a major problem. Of 920 alleged *anti-Terrorist* ~~PHUNG~~ HOANG operations in the last three months only 57 involved contact. The Province Chief is aware of this deficiency and *all*

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is extremely interested in bettering intelligence collection efforts. The National Police are, on a whole, making good progress in their efforts at District level. Coordination and cooperation between concerned agencies remains a problem at Province level.

all

8. PHU BON:

The Province POC is functioning well, with good cooperation between the various agencies. However, neutralization efforts in September resulted in only three category B VCI being apprehended.

all

9. PHU YEN:

Neither the August nor the September Province Reports make substantive mention of PHUNG HOANG or the POC's. The MR II Senior PHUNG HOANG Advisor notes the following:

a. A coordinated intelligence collection effort is still lacking.

b. Of 1,044 ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ operations, only 162 had contact.

c. The Province Police Chief is convinced that the ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ organization, or assignment of responsibilities, will change again in January 1973, and is not anxious to push too hard.

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d. Only 6% of VCI neutralizations in the last

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two months were of confirmed VCI. *all*

10. PLEIKU:

The military situation in this Province has taken precedence over almost anything else, however, effective *Anti-Terrorist* ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ operations are still continuing. Between 18 and 25 September a combined Police/Sub-sector effort rolled up a total of 18 VCI in An My Village, Le Trung District. This roll up was initiated by a GVN sympathizer's tip which resulted in two VCI KIA and the capture of numerous documents, the further exploitation of which produced the remaining 16 neutralizations. *all*

11. QUANG DUC:

Anti-Terrorist The MR II Dong Khoi campaign, which uses ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ intelligence in tactical operations, started on 24 August in Duc Lap District, and led to the apprehension of 11 individuals believed to be members of the Duc Minh Village Committee and the Duc Lap District Committee. No further substantive information is available. *all*

12. TUYEN DUC:

The PHUNG HOANG program is well underway here, with a good intelligence collection effort. Significant neutralizations in September included the Chief of the Bong Lai Hamlet Security Section, the Chief of the Don Duong District PRP Committee Rear Service Section and the *all*

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Chief and Deputy Chief of the Duc Trong District Unit.
A problem still exists however in province level co-
ordination and control.

13. CAM RANH CITY:

The National Police showed marked improvement in both August and September, evidently helped by a new Police Chief. Unfortunately the Mayor has myopia as concerns VCI, insisting that there aren't any, his staff disagrees, real progress will be difficult to achieve without the support of the Mayor.

III. MILITARY REGION III

1. BIEN HOA:

Despite instructions to establish POC's on 12 June 1972, serious reorganization is just beginning in Bien Hoa Province. Essentially this means that, although some POC related matters were conducted, specific plans to comply with the true meaning of the directive are just currently being implemented. One accomplishment was the establishment of a model POC in Di An District. Although this is a very effective layout, its duplication would be near impossible in most provinces due to a current lack of adequate space. Currently there is a fair exchange of information with member agencies, but very little

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information is received from military sources in the area. There is good information on the physical location of member agency sources and on ^{SRG}~~PRU~~ operations. Although dossiers are being maintained, specific targeting is not clearly understood. Further, dossiers at province level do not reflect the same information as dossiers at district level on the same individual. There is a shortage of 17 persons within province ^{POC Anti Terrorist Bureau,}~~PHUNG HOANG~~ offices, including 13 National Policemen. There is poor follow-up in some districts; for example, in Duc Tu District, 114 VCI members have been identified and only 12 confirmed, and in Tan Uyen District 162 have been identified, but only 42 confirmed. There are poor plans throughout the province for the apprehension of targeted VCI.

2. BINH DUONG:

^{POC Anti Terrorist}
The ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort in this province is strong in several areas. The National Police Chief is highly motivated, intelligent, and forceful. He runs a "tight shop", due to his efforts excellent targeting is conducted down to and including village level, and dossiers are maintained in an efficient and current manner. Two individuals are assigned to each case, and report daily on the development of the case. In fact, one Chieu Hoi

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POC *anti Terrorist*
~~PHUNG HOANG~~ service member works with each National Policeman in the program. A good people's intelligence net is also established, and member agency cooperation and coordination reflects the positive attitude of the Police Chief. His is one of the few systems in which an individual from the PF platoon in each village works in concert with ^{POC}~~PHUNG HOANG~~ personnel. Although the Province and District Chiefs support the ^{*Anti-Terrorist*}~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort, they have not yet established a cohesive plan for the apprehension of the targeted VCI using the resources available to them.

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3. BINH LONG:

Due to the NVA attack in April all PHUNG HOANG physical assets, including vehicles, were either lost or destroyed. Illegal VCI are currently administering areas overrun by the NVA. The legal VCI are not operating in the province due to the paucity of remaining personnel. They did, however, follow the refugees into Phu Van Camp, the Binh Duong Province refugee camp. An eight-man team is conducting anti-VCI operations in the refugee camp. This operation, thus far, has resulted in the apprehension of 7 VCI who are presently detained in the Province Interrogation Center. Forty others have been identified and are currently under PSB surveillance. Some of the refugees

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from Binh Long Province are also housed in An Loi Camp, the Bien Hoa refugee camp in the vicinity of Long Thanh, where anti-VCI activity is also being implemented. Results of that operation thus far are meager.

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4. BINH TUY:

The Public Safety Advisor and the PHUNG HOANG Advisor in Binh Tuy Province have an excellent working relationship, and have been involved in the furtherance of the anti-VCI effort for several months. This notwithstanding, the PHUNG HOANG program in the province is not strong. Many of the problems are caused by a lack of direction by the Province Chief over PHUNG HOANG matters. For this reason, personnel in the Permanent Office do not function properly in providing guidance for PHUNG HOANG operations. Also, the proper personnel have not been transferred to the POC, and there is doubt as to who should direct such assignment. The province had a serious office supply problem, but this has been resolved by action of this headquarters. There is a slow flow of information from the village to the province, and when a lead is given to a village by the district it is developed too slowly. There is much turmoil concerning the conduct of inspections throughout the province, but hopefully this will shortly be resolved. However, five individuals in the inspection section are untrained. The

POC anti-Terrorist

POC anti-Terrorist

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The current Permanent Office Chief, an ARVN Captain, dislikes working with the National Police. He is a deterrent to progress and should be replaced. Further, the entire *POC Anti-Terrorist* ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort in Binh Tuy needs greater support and direction from the Province Chief. *all*

5. GIA DINH:

POC's exist at all levels. Adequate coordination between various friendly agencies has been established, especially in the exchange of information. The POC communication system is adequate in Gia Dinh, but additional telephones are needed for the POC. As of August the Gia Dinh POC virtually ceased to operate due to two problems brought about by the reorganization. The first problem is the malassignment of personnel. Of the original five PSB personnel three have been improperly assigned to the Permanent Office rather than the POC, while the two who are actually in the POC are ineffective. The Situation Section of the POC is run by a MSS NCO, who is only a paper handler. The second problem involves an unwillingness to accept responsibility or to carry out certain functions until SOP 4 is received. *all*

6. HAU NGHIA:

The main thrust in this province has been to train at least five targeting officers in all facets of this procedure, with the hope that specific targeting *all*

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will then be implemented. Hence, an overall improvement in the program would result. To date this effort has not been successfully implemented. Therefore, the program has several deficiencies. Permanent Office and POC personnel do not clearly understand their mission and are not functioning properly. Dossiers show a lack of imagination in specific targeting procedures and would be useless, at this point in time, to get convictions, if in fact, the VCI members were apprehended. Police officials, to include the Province and District Police Chiefs are weak, poorly motivated, and some are possibly corrupt. There is a critical need for restructuring of the PHUNG HOANG program in Hau Nghia, and this is currently underway.

7. LONG AN:

This province is characterized by widely dispersed hamlets which allows the VCI to operate with little fear of apprehension. Further, reporting of VCI activity is limited due to the lack of a good communications system. The people, however, are working with the police in reporting VCI activities. But the reports arrive too late for effective police reaction. As in most of the provinces, the police in Long An are poorly educated. The Province Chief seems to be beset with a multitude of problems, and does not seem able to absorb the VCI threat or the PHUNG HOANG concept.

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The PHUNG HOANG Committee meets weekly, but little is accomplished. The reason for the lack of accomplishment is the assumption that most of the VCI have left the province and are concentrating their efforts towards the GVN structure in the Saigon area. One of the districts, Binh Phuoc, is particularly weak in ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ activities. *POC Anti Terrorist* It is clearly evident that personnel there do not understand ~~PHUNG HOANG~~, *POC concept* are poorly motivated towards it, and will require considerable training and stronger leadership in order to establish a viable program. The situation was also further complicated by the fact that intelligence personnel were not transferred to the POC as directed, nor do they provide intelligence data to it. This district has been given a high priority for command assistance. *all*

8. LONG KHANH:

POC Anti Terrorist
The ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort in Long Khanh Province is just getting started in a positive direction. Initially, the Province Chief showed little interest or enthusiasm for *the POC Anti Terrorist programs.* ~~PHUNG HOANG~~. His attitude has changed, but he is not to be classified as a "hard charger". US and VN personnel are working in concert. However, many of the Vietnamese personnel are inexperienced and low quality. At the village level this problem is acute. One method being used to *all*

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resolve it is training seminars where personnel are brought to the Province Permanent Office for ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ instruction in methodology and ^{apprehension} ~~targeting~~ procedures. The US element developed an excellent plan for VCI apprehension and control. The Province Chief approved the plan and showed enthusiasm for it. However, recently his interest in the plan has waned. Hence the PSA is currently trying to re-sell it to him. With the exception of Kiem Tam District, the people's intelligence net throughout the province is poor. This was caused by the reluctance, initially, of the Province Chief to get out and meet and instill confidence in the people in the local government. A major threat in Long Khanh is posed by members of the VCI who move in and out of the province from sub-regions. Currently, no effective plan exists for the control of this category of personnel. This threat is further compounded by the fact that only approximately 40 percent of the people understand PHUNG HOANG and the role it is designed to play in the neutralization of the VCI.

all

9. PHUOC LONG:

The geographic location of this province is in itself, a deterrent to a successful ^{POC Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program. It is extremely isolated. Hence, it is difficult to get

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quality personnel assigned there. It is possible that those who are assigned are either so poorly qualified that they merited such assignment or are being disciplined. Personnel shortages are critical. The province is, or believes itself to be, short 207 policemen. This shortage, naturally, has had the greatest impact on ~~PHUNG HOANG~~. ^{the NP anti Terrorist plans & POC anti Terrorist actions} The province Police Chief is not attuned to ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ and has made no ~~honest~~ effort to keep a ~~viable~~ program going. Most personnel are untrained and some personnel perform three separate functions. A case in point is Duc Phong District where the POC/Permanent Office Chief duties are performed by one untrained NCO. There is also a critical space problem in this district. Most of the population are mountain people who are so carefully controlled by the VCI in isolated bases that a people's intelligence net is near impossible to establish. The available member agencies work in a vacuum, and there is little exchange of intelligence by which the VCI could be apprehended. Personnel also have a poor understanding of the modus operandi of ~~PHUNG HOANG~~. ^{anti Terrorist activities} This province has top priority for command emphasis and restructuring. A training team will also be sent there.

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10. PHUOC TUY

^{POC anti Terrorist}
The ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort is starting to fall into place in Phuoc Tuy Province. The Province National Police

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is new, his attitude is positive and he shows concern for the ^{Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program. The province has a good mixture of young intelligent ARVN and National Police cadre. There is a critical space problem in Dat Do District in that the National Police Headquarters was 100 percent destroyed during the April offensive; however, no records were lost. Personnel in this district understand ^{Anti Terrorist plans} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ and their dossiers are excellent; however, their VCI apprehension plans are weak. In Long Dien district the dossiers are incomplete, do not contain situation overlays, and would be of little use in getting VCI convictions. Further, there are poor plans for VCI apprehension. Long Le District is about the same as Long Dien District. Although there is a good understanding for VCI organization and apprehension, information is poorly recorded in the dossier; and there is no concerted effort to neutralize the VCI. all

11. TAY NINH:

The PHUNG HOANG program in Tay Ninh can be classified as weak and bordering on being unsatisfactory. The Province Chief and Province National Police Chief are poorly motivated towards ^{POC Anti-Terrorist plans} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~, and this reflects down to the district level. In Khiem Hanh District most personnel are new and are just learning how to implement ^{Anti-Terrorist plans.} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~. Further, several have not received formal ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ training. POC all

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The District Chief was assigned on 2 October. He has a good record as a combat commander and seems anxious to take hold. During preparation for reorganization of the POC member agencies withdrew their personnel. Consequently, few trained people are available to work on specific targeting. The dossiers also reflect this, for they do not contain: a file on the extract of information, they have no plan of action, and no requests for EEI. Hieu Thien District is worse; very little motivation exists there and district and NP Chiefs are not with the program. Further, few trained persons are available for ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ ^{Anti Terrorist Bureau}. In Phuoc Ninh District the RD cadre were withdrawn from the program in July despite directives that required them to support ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ ^{the POC}. Dossiers are very poorly maintained, and represent poor targeting efforts. They do not contain situation overlays and work sheets are incomplete. There is poor planning in this province for VCI apprehension or neutralization and it will require a concerted effort to get a ^{good} ~~viable~~ program going.

IV MILITARY REGION IV

1. AN GIANG:

An Giang is one of two most pacified provinces in MR IV (the other is Go Cong). There was one neutralization in August and two in September. One reason for the low number of neutralizations is that most VCI must reside outside the province and can only operate within it

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sporadically. This is substantiated by the fact that 34 of 38 villages are totally cleared of VCI. There is a degree of complacency among ^{NP Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG-HOANG~~ personnel in province, but they are believed capable of reacting to intelligence of VCI activity, if any should occur.

all

2. AN XUYEN:

As of 30 September it was estimated that enemy strengths in An Xuyen amounted to NVA: 1,090, Main Force: 433, Local Force: 390, Guerrillas: 3,679, and VCI: 4,389. The resurgence of the VC in their traditional U Minh stronghold has caused difficulties for the ^{NP Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG-HOANG~~ program. This occurred when the ARVN 21st Division moved to An Loc in April. Since the division returned in July the National Police have not regained the operational capability they had before the division left. Neutralizations decreased from 36 in July to 23 in August and 22 in September. However, there were 10 VCI captured in September as the result of specific targeting. In addition, the VC Party Chairman of Song Ong Doc District was killed on a recent operation.

all

3. BAC LIEU:

Integration of the Anti-Terrorism elements of the former PIOCC/DIOCC's into the POC's has been completed in all districts and at province level. However, the ^{NP Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG-HOANG~~

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program seems to have declined in Bac Lieu since this reorganization. This is due mainly to a lack of interest and emphasis by the Province Police Chief. In Gai Rai, formerly Bac Lieu's most productive district, the ^{NP}~~PHUNG~~ *all* *anti Terrorist* ~~HOANG~~ program has come to a standstill.

4. BA XUYEN:

As of August 1972, Ba Xuyen had 432 identified VCI and 804 unidentified A and B category VCI, for a total of 1,236. *Anti Terrorist* ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ operations for the month of August totaled 218, with 18 KIA, 14 CIA, and 2 rallied. Total neutralizations for the month were 23. During this month the Province Chief directed that all tactical operations would include police units which will be used to screen people in areas covered by the operations. This has increased the number of VCI captures: *Anti Terrorist* ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ operations for the month of September totaled 133, with 11 KIA, 7 CIA and 9 rallied. Total neutralizations for the month amounted to 23. The MR IV Senior ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ *Anti Terrorist* Advisor characterizes the ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program in Ba Xuyen as stagnant, although some improvement has been noted since the reorganization. *all*

5. CHAU DOC:

Results in terms of both detained and sentenced were high during the F-6 program. Neutralizations of A and B VCI increased from 37 in July to 62 in August, and *all*

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decreased to 37 in September. However, 30 of the neutralizations in September were as a result of sentencing. The ^{Anti Terrorism} PHUNG HOANG program in Chau Doc has been one of the best in MR IV in terms of organization and results. With the recent appointment of a new Province Police Chief, Chau Doc Province is expected to continue to equal, if not surpass, its past performance. all

6. CHUONG THIEN:

^{Anti Terrorism}
The PHUNG HOANG program in Chuong Thien is suffering from a lack of leadership and direction by seemingly lower quality of Vietnamese officials who are assigned to agencies within this province. The Province has had two POC and two Permanent Office Chiefs in the last two months. Neutralizations increased slightly from 39 in July to 40 in August to 45 in September. Thus a level seems to have been reached in this province over the last three months that will probably continue despite the large VCI population. The military situation which exists in Chuong Thien makes National Police operations difficult, a situation which is expected to continue. Maldistribution of the 1,426 National Policemen is evident, with all village police stations operating below strength. The National Police are characterized as faction-ridden and ineffective. The F-6 program in this province was termed "abortive", with only 56 arrests for the period June-September 1972. all

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7. DINH TUONG:

The National Police in Dinh Tuong have made the ^{Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program one of the best in Delta in terms of operational results. This has been accomplished in spite of an NVA incursion into the western districts. Neutralizations rose sharply from 52 in July to 75 in August and 101 in September. The September total is the highest number of monthly neutralizations achieved by a province in MR IV in 1972. The future of the ^{Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program appears bright, and the National Police have begun to maximize their use of intelligence.

all

8. GO CONG:

VCI increased their taxation and propaganda activities significantly in August and September. VCI were reported in most of the 205 enemy sightings recorded during the month. There are presently 77 identified and 13 estimated VCI carried in the Province. Neutralizations increased from 7 in July to 16 in August. Despite some complacency, the National Police are considered capable of dealing with the problem, barring a flow of major VC/NVA elements.

all

9. KIEN GIANG:

The integration of the Anti-Terrorism element into the POC at province level has enhanced the effectiveness of the ^{Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program in Kien Giang. Prior to integration, the greatest problem was to implement specific targeting

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techniques. Currently, the three reaction forces available to the POC (SRG, APT, and NP Field Police) are conducting an average of two targeted operations each week. In each case, the Operations Section targets specific VCI based on intelligence derived from the Situation Section. Improvement has been noted in the collation of intelligence into existing dossiers, the effective planning of operations, and specific targeting. Improvement, however, is still needed in levying specific intelligence requirements. Furthermore, tasked agencies are not responding effectively to specific intelligence requirements that are levied. In general, the future of the ^{Anti Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program appears bright, and the National Police have begun to make optimum use of the intelligence and forces available.

10. KIEN HOA:

National Police effectiveness has increased in Kien Hoa. In August, Kien Hoa neutralized the second highest monthly total of A & B VCI in MR IV for CY 72 to date with a total of 87. Neutralizations decreased in September to 51. This decrease is attributed to the fact that the PSC held only one meeting during the month of September. There is a major problem of collocating the Anti-Terrorism Element within the POC on the National Police Compound at province

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and in all the districts. Funds have been requested through National Police Command channels for the construction of the necessary facilities to permit collocation. The flow of intelligence and reaction to intelligence should be enhanced with collocation. The recent infiltration of NVA and main force VC units makes police operations difficult in many of the insecure districts. Nevertheless, an operation of almost textbook perfection succeeded in neutralizing a whole sapper/armed reconnaissance company. *all*

11. KIEN PHONG:

anti-terrorist
The ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program is completely under National Police control. Neutralizations remain very low, with only 5 VCI being neutralized in the months of July and August, and 6 in September. Part of the problem is the military situation in the province, but there is also *anti-terrorist* is a lack of emphasis placed on the ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ effort in this province. *all*

12. KIEN TUONG:

anti-terrorist
~~PHUNG HOANG~~ neutralizations of A & B VCI dropped from 13 in July (primarily because of low percentage of sentencing), to 2 in August. Near the end of the month of August the Province Chief began to accentuate ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ *anti-terrorist* and initiated regular inspections of the districts with a team headed by the Province Deputy Police Chief. *all*

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Results for September, however, were only 3 A level VCI killed and 7 A and B VCI sentenced. As in Kien Phong, the military situation has not permitted the National Police to effectively operate as yet to eliminate the VCI. Also, many of the VCI operate from either remote, uninhabited areas in the Plaines de Jarres, or from across the Cambodian border.

13. PHONG DINH:

There were 39 A and B VCI neutralizations during August, a rise of 9 from July. In September, of a total of 67 neutralizations, 48 A and B VCI were neutralized by sentencing. This is attributed to the fact that the Province Security Committee is now meeting regularly. Although the *anti-Terrorist* PHUNG HOANG program in Phong Dinh is fairly effective, better operational results should be achieved by collocating the Anti-Terrorism Element with the POC on the National Police Compound at province. In five of the seven districts this has not been accomplished. Two of the five expect collocation by 15 October. The Province Chief has begun visiting District POC's, which should result in some improvements.

14. SADEC:

Operational effectiveness of the National Police progressed during August and September, as the Province Chief emphasized the program. VCI neutralizations rose from 3 in

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July to 15 in August. Six A and B VCI were killed in September, and 14 were captured. During September, particular improvement was noted in intelligence collection. Sadec ranks third in pacification in the Delta, and the present level of neutralizations is reasonable, although more aggressiveness would no doubt net an increased number of neutralizations. } all

15. VINH BINH:

Neutralizations increased from 33 in July to 46 in August, but decreased to 32 in September. In addition, 70% of all VCI appearing before the PSC in July and August were convicted and sentenced. All eight A and B VCI brought before the PSC in August were sentenced. During September 83% of VCI appearing before the PSC were sentenced, including four seven A and B VCI. The National Police is fairly effective in its operation of the ^{Anti-Terrorist} PHUNG HOANG program in most of Vinh Binh, although the district of Long Toan is much less secure and has a higher ratio of VCI than the other districts. Too many district NP commanders are second lieutenants. } all

16. VINH LONG:

Neutralizations increased from 27 A and B VCI in July to 31 in August. However, neutralizations increased } all

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sharply in September with a total of 63, 48 of whom were ralliers. This is an increase of 41 ralliers over the previous month's total. This increase is attributed to the improved efforts of the APT's. The POC's are all manned and operational, but seem to be experiencing some administrative difficulties, further details not available.

In general, the National Police appear capable of conducting an effective ^{Anti-Terrorist} ~~PHUNG HOANG~~ program and future progress is expected.

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